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This article provides a narrative of the shooting in Jerusalem by two Palestinian gunmen – 
Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah and Sami al-Ansari – in June 1936 during the Arab revolt in 
Palestine of a British police officer, Alan Edward Sigrist. Abu Gharbiyah and al-Ansari 
specifically targeted Sigrist because of his violence towards Palestinians, an issue that has 
not been discussed fully in the literature. This study measures Abu Gharbiyah’s account of 
why he shot Sigrist against the contemporary record, using the shooting as a case study to 
open up debates on the British use of official and unofficial violence to maintain colonial rule, 
alongside one on the response of local people to such violence. While recognizing the partisan 
nature of Abu Gharbiyah’s memory of events in Palestine, the article gives voice to the 
Palestinians, explaining how and why rebels fighting British rule and Jewish immigration to 
Palestine used violence. Following the analysis of the shooting of Sigrist, the article details 
more general torture by British forces as recalled by Abu Gharbiyah, setting this against the 
extant evidence to test the traditional notion that Britain used ‘minimum force’ in 
countering colonial disturbances, tying Sigrist’s behaviour to that of British troops and 
police in Palestine more generally. Thus, while the article is narrow in its focus it has 
broader implications for contemporary imperial and military history. 
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Just before midday on Friday, 12 June 1936 by St Stephen’s (or Lions’) Gate outside 
the Old City of Jerusalem, two armed Palestinians, Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah and Sami 
al-Ansari, both teachers aged respectively twenty and eighteen, ambushed a car 
containing British acting Assistant Police Superintendent Alan Sigrist and his guard, 
British Constable Edmund Doxat. The assailants’ primary target was the senior 
officer, Sigrist, notorious locally for his violent attacks against Palestinians, not 
Doxat. This was almost two months into the Arab revolt in Palestine during which 
Palestinian rebels targeted British officials, in protest against Britain’s policy of 
supporting Jewish immigration and settlement to the country. The assassins shot 
Sigrist but did not kill him.  
 
In June 2009, Abu Gharbiyah, now ninety-three, agreed to an interview with this 
author at his home in Amman to discuss his reasons for trying to kill Sigrist, or this, 
at least, is what the interviewer wanted to discuss.1 In fact, for much of the time Abu 
Gharbiyah talked about the British in the context of the Palestinian struggle 
generally.  The discussion of Sigrist was not as detailed as the interviewer would 
have wished and accorded with the account of Sigrist’s shooting as detailed in Abu 
Gharbiyah’s memoirs published in Arabic in 1993.2 Unexpectedly, the interview 
moved on to examine police torture in Palestine, with Abu Gharbiyah levelling 
specific charges against the British. Subsequent correspondence sent by way of Abu 
Gharbiyah’s son who was present at the interview – Abu Gharbiyah has poor 
eyesight – clarified a number of points on the Sigrist shooting. 
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While oral history has its pitfalls – certainly one as partisan as Abu Gharbiyah’s, a 
life-long advocate of the Palestinian cause – the contemporary record supports Abu 
Gharbiyah’s memory of Sigrist’s violent behaviour in 1936. Abu Gharbiyah’s 
recollections open up debates on the use of violence in Palestine in the late 1930s by 
the British and the Palestinians. Sigrist was not a target of opportunity – one based 
on vulnerability, chance and the ease with which assassins could execute an 
operation – but his was a pro-active attack against a hated local official by two 
determined men. There were other such targeted attacks by Palestinians against 
particularly disliked British officials, such as the colonial officials Lewis Andrews 
and W.S.S. Moffat, both shot dead by assassins later on in the revolt; similarly, 
Jewish fighters in Palestine also targeted particular British officials, especially after 
1945.3 What is not discussed here is the rebels’ targeting of Palestinian and Jewish 
police officers, a relevant issue but beyond the remit of this article. 
 
Abu Gharbiyah’s discussion of the police and prison service in Palestine, detailing 
torture in dedicated centres for such purposes, raises wider questions about the use 
of violence in Palestine at this time. Was Sigrist’s violence an isolated activity or an 
example of a wider malaise affecting the forces of law and order in British Mandate 
Palestine? Abu Gharbiyah claims that he and al-Ansari were responding to general 
brutality within the Army, police and prison service in Jerusalem that had some 
official sanction. During the Arab revolt, a police Criminal Investigation Department 
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(CID) officer told Abu Gharbiyah how, ‘You haven’t seen anything yet; we will use 
the same things against you as we did in Ireland.’4 The reference to illegal British 
activities in Ireland during the war of independence there (1919-21) suggests a 
continuity of violence across colonial conflicts. In Ireland, even ordinary British 
units such as the Essex Regiment had an in-house ‘Torture Squad’ that used pincers 
and pliers on Irish nationalist prisoners, driving one victim insane.5 Caroline Elkins 
in her study of British counter-rebel operations in Kenya in the 1950s supports Abu 
Gharbiyah’s memory of the activities of CID in Palestine, implicating CID and 
Special Branch officers in Kenya with some of the worst brutality – the colony’s 
Gestapo as one officer put it.6 
 
Recent studies on the Arab revolt and on British counter-insurgency generally 
support Abu Gharbiyah’s memory.7 Such works outline human-rights abuses in 
countering colonial unrest, challenging the theory that Britain used ‘minimum force’ 
in its colonial campaigns against insurgents, something that supposedly 
differentiated Britain from other colonial and neo-colonial powers.8 There was, 
perhaps, continuity in the behaviour of the British security forces, with the police 
and soldiers often working together to brutalize colonial peoples. This stretched 
from the Egyptian revolt (1919) and the Irish war of independence (1919-21) to 
Palestine in the 1930s and 1940s – the Jewish insurgency in the 1940s being neatly 
covered in David Cesarani’s recent study – through Kenya and Cyprus in the 1950s 
to Aden and Northern Ireland in the 1960s and 1970s.9 Such a discussion is useful as 
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in counter-insurgency theory and practice there is usually no interest in human 
rights per se, only in how respect for civilians’ dignity is an issue inasmuch as it 
helps or hinders military plans to defeat insurgents, and so might require a friendly 
or minimally hostile populace. Human rights are a peripheral, indirect problem to 
the key driver of military operations. 
 
This article starts with a narrative account of the dramatic events of 12 June 1936 – 
showing how an assassination was planned and executed – before examining the 
activities of Sigrist prior to his shooting. The essay then moves to a broader 
discussion of police and army brutality in Palestine, pivoting the analysis on Abu 
Gharbiyah’s memory of events. The shooting of Sigrist gets little mention in the 
English-language literature, unsurprising considering the large number of attacks 
on British officials in Palestine during the revolt. In Arabic, the Palestinian 
(Christian) educator and writer Khalil al-Sakakini mentions the incident in his diary, 
as does Abu Gharbiyah in his written memoir, but it is not included in the Arabic 
secondary literature; nor is it covered in the Hebrew literature.10 Tom Segev’s nicely 
crafted (and translated) One Palestine, Complete (2000) does mention the outrage, 
very briefly: ‘a young Arab [al-Ansari] opened fire on the car of a Jerusalem police 
officer, wounding him. A British soldier returned fire; the Arab was hit and later 
died.’11 Sigrist’s shooting deserves fuller treatment. 
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Sigrist was on a tour of the police units guarding the gates of the Old City when he 
was shot. This was the day for Friday prayers – ‘the streets were heavy with anger’ – 
and British security was especially tight.12 Sigrist was driving a left-hand drive car 
on the right side of the road as cars had been introduced to Palestine in the Ottoman 
era, before the British – who drive on the left – arrived in 1917.13 The British drove 
both left- and right-hand drive vehicles in Palestine at this time, the police using a 
mix of Austin and Morris cars.14 The Cowley car plant in the UK produced the 
Morris cars issued to the Palestine police with right-hand drives but as Sigrist was 
driving a left-hand drive vehicle it was either an Austin or, as the official report 
states, ‘his own car.’15 Doxat sat to Sigrist’s right in the passenger seat armed with a 
British Army-issue Lee-Enfield rifle and a Service revolver pistol. As the two men 
drove away from St Stephen’s Gate following Sigrist’s visit to the police picket there, 
the assassins, who had been tracking Sigrist’s daily schedule, struck on the Jericho 
road just outside, shooting Sigrist on the incline by the Muslim cemetery a few 
meters before the turn at the northeast corner of the Old City walls opposite the 
Rockefeller Museum and by the Stork Tower. Sigrist being on the road-side side of 
the car meant that the two assassins had to step into the middle of the road to shoot 
him, and as both men aimed at Sigrist this left Doxat temporarily free to return fire. 
The assassins had chosen this spot as Sigrist’s car slowed on the incline before the 
turning; Abu Gharbiyah’s memory is that both men were ‘calm and in full control of 
the situation’ when they launched their attack.16  
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The Palestine Post reported that the two assassins had hidden below the side of the 
Jericho road before the attack, a claim refuted by Abu Gharbiyah who later wrote 
that they were both walking openly in the street; other accounts have the men 
jumping on and even into the car.17 For the attack, Abu Gharbiyah had hidden his 
weapon under his tarbush headwear, what is known in the West as a fez, while al-
Ansari’s was in his pocket. Both assassins had 7mm automatic pistols, Abu 
Gharbiyah an Italian Beretta and al-Ansari a French Lafayette, which could fire 
about seven rounds each in one shooting.18 The use of the tarbush to conceal 
weapons was possible early in the revolt. Later on, rebels insisted that all 
Palestinians should ditch the tarbush popular amongst more urbane town-folk and 
don instead the rural kufiya (also known as the hatta or igal) turban-style headwear 
so that rural rebels operating in the towns could more easily blend in with the 
populace. It was an act of ‘sartorial patriotism.’19 The return of the tarbush in 1939 
was a visible sign that the revolt was over. 
 
Abu Gharbiyah and al-Ansari fired together from about a meter away at Sigrist who 
was inside the car, wounding him twice in the shoulder and side.20 Abu Gharbiyah 
had his left hand at one stage on the front left wing of the car. Abu Gharbiyah and 
al-Ansari had agreed to fire slowly but Doxat, struggling with his rifle inside the 
confined space of the car, managed to return fire with his pistol that he had 
previously drawn on seeing the two men loitering in the area, so al-Ansari shouted 
at Abu Gharbiyah to shoot more rapidly.21 Doxat was quick off the mark as he was 
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returning fire at the same time or even before the two assassins opened up with 
their weapons on Sigrist, shooting at first to his left across his comrade and through 
his open window, a decisive reaction that would surely have deafened Sigrist.22 
Doxat and the assassins also exchanged bullets through the windscreen, with Abu 
Gharbiyah’s bullets bouncing off the glass after which Doxat returned fire shattering 
the glass.23 The windscreens and door tops of all new vehicles sent to Palestine in 
the early 1930s were fitted with Triplex toughened glass that perhaps helped to 
deflect bullets.24 In the mêlée, al-Ansari emptied his pistol and ran off, wounded, 
shot by Doxat in the fire-fight. His direction of flight is uncertain, either to the south 
and east towards Gethsemane and the Kidron valley, or to the north towards Wadi 
el-Joz according to Abu Gharbiyah.25 Abu Gharbiyah fired off his last three rounds 
at Doxat, aware that by chance an Army-escorted Jewish Potash Company convoy 
was fast approaching the scene from the southeast. 
 
Sigrist had slumped back when shot, releasing his feet from the car’s pedals, so 
Doxat had shot al-Ansari while inside a vehicle rolling backwards, under fire, 
pulling on the hand-brake, and alongside his badly wounded superior officer – no 
mean feat. The history of the Palestine police recounts that Doxat was able to ‘leap 
out’ of the car and shoot al-Ansari; a contemporary newspaper report states that he 
‘whipped out’ his revolver and fired through the windscreen at one of his 
assailants.26 The car rolled backwards off the road over a drop into a rocky wadi 
landing upright with Sigrist and Doxat inside, both badly bruised, the engine still 
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running.27 Abu Gharbiyah’s recollection is that Doxat had exited the vehicle before it 
went over the edge into the wadi.28 Filastin [Palestine] noted that Doxat was 
wounded in the thigh but this does not appear to have been a gunshot; the Palestine 
Post credited Doxat with a ‘slight’ neck wound in addition to some ‘other injuries’ 
sustained when the car fell into the valley.29 In total, six bullets hit the car; up to 
eight rounds missed the target or were not fired off.30 
 
A private car took Sigrist to the government hospital in the British headquarters in 
the ‘Russian compound’ in west Jerusalem. Doxat soon joined him. On 14 June, 
Sigrist and Doxat were reportedly ‘cheerful’ in hospital after the incident and both 
recovered but Sigrist never returned to police work in Palestine. Sigrist was still 
‘cheerful’ on the 15 June, in true British style; by September 1936, he was back in 
England.31 Once he had recovered, Sigrist returned to duty, subsequently serving in 
the police forces in Tanganyika, Aden and Cyrenaica. He died at home in England 
on 1 March 1983, outliving al-Ansari but outlived by Abu Gharbiyah.32 
 
The crew and soldiers of the Potash Company convoy tracked the wounded al-
Ansari and a police search with a dog uncovered him hiding in a nearby house; he 
died on the way to the hospital or ‘later’ in hospital of his wounds.33 Meanwhile, 
Abu Gharbiyah had run off towards Wadi el-Joz and returned to his family home 
inside the Old City near the Haram ash Sharif via the Musrara neighbourhood and 
the New Gate in time to go off to Friday prayers at the al-Aqsa mosque with his 
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brother, alive to the gossip spreading about the recent outrage. The British insisted 
that al-Ansari’s funeral be held after the curfew hour of 7 p.m. so while several 
hundred people attended the funeral service at the mosque, only twenty to thirty 
mourners followed his body to his grave.  
 
Doxat had shot al-Ansari in the chest – if Doxat was using a Webley pistol, this fired 
an especially powerful round – but al-Ansari was alive when captured and being 
tended in a house by two local men, both of whom the British also arrested.34 British 
forces took al-Ansari to Government Hospital, alongside Sigrist and Doxat. Abu 
Gharbiyah detailed British soldiers throwing al-Ansari onto the back of a lorry and 
denying him first aid, after which in hospital he told police CID officers who had 
rushed to the scene to interview him that he had acted alone, an obvious lie.35 A 
local Palestinian, al-Sakakini recorded how soldiers beat al-Ansari, including with 
rifle butts, in the lorry on the way to the hospital.36 Abu Gharbiyah maintains that 
al-Ansari was ‘conscious’ when he reached the hospital.37 The charge that al-Ansari 
was maltreated on the way to the hospital is borne out by other cases where the 
police allegedly maltreated and assassinated suspects. British Palestine policeman 
Sydney Burr told his parents that colleagues who were tired of the legal system 
carried out extra-judicial assassinations and ‘shot out of hand’ suspects.38 John 
Briance, a police officer who later became the head of the CID in Palestine, confessed 
to his mother of colleagues’ shooting on the spot an arrested rebel in 1938.39 
 
11 
 
Being a British colonial or military official made someone a target. Palestinians 
attacked British police officers, soldiers and officials, including high-profile victims 
such as British police Inspector-General R.G.B. Spicer who in 1937 had a ‘narrow 
escape’ when a would-be assassin emptied his pistol into his car at point-blank 
range as Spicer was being driven into the Russian compound.40 On 28 May 1936, 
inside Jerusalem’s Old City, rebels killed British Constable Robert (or Ronald) Bird 
with three shots from the window of a building, one of which went through his 
heart.41 At the same time as the Sigrist shooting, rebels tried to kill J.A.M. Faraday, 
Deputy Superintendent in Nazareth.42 
 
But the rebels also discriminated, picking on particularly hated authority figures 
such as the pro-Zionist Assistant District Commissioner in Galilee, Lewis Andrews, 
shot dead leaving church in Nazareth on 26 September 1937. In Jenin on 24 August 
1938, an assassin shot nine times and killed acting Assistant District Commissioner 
W.S.S. Moffat, ‘known for his bad behaviour,’ a man who, Abu Gharbiyah claims, 
lined up Palestinian villagers during the revolt and shot every fifth man when 
hidden rifles were not produced for the authorities.43 Punitive demolitions of 
buildings in Jenin followed Moffat’s death. The British quickly apprehended 
Moffat’s assassin after the murder – he was, apparently, a blond hunchback and so 
rather visible – after which in the tradition of al-Ansari he died in custody, trying to 
escape, despite his disability and being surrounded by fit, young British soldiers.44 
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‘Shot trying to escape’ is a recurring phrase in British files. That said, the Arabs 
nicknamed Moffat’s assassin, ‘Mohammed,’ ‘gazelle’ because he was so swift.45  
 
While Abu Gharbiyah and al-Ansari acted alone in targeting Sigrist – they were not 
hit-men for a superior rebel organization such as the Arab Higher Committee – their 
assault was a collective revenge attack by Jerusalemites against an officer who was 
notorious across the city for his savage truncheon-wielding attacks on Arab 
townsfolk – until ‘their bodies were broken’ – including beating up the staff of the 
al-Difa‘ [The Defence] newspaper office on 31 May 1936.46 Sigrist launched 
indiscriminate assaults on Arab passers-by, including against a well-dressed Arab 
District Officer official who was outside the Damascus Gate by the Schmidt school 
and who refused the British police demand that he pick up nails left by rebels 
hoping to puncture the tyres of passing vehicles.47 Sigrist and his men wounded 
dozens in their attack on the al-Difa‘ office, breaking a man’s nose with a truncheon 
so badly that the victim was hospitalized, dripping with blood and in a ‘perilous 
state.’48 At the same time, they also smashed in the windows at the Arab Club, one 
of a number of sports clubs in the city. Abu Gharbiyah boxed at the Islamic Club.  
On another occasion, one of Sigrist’s blows left a man with concussion. 
Jerusalemites cleared the streets when they heard the approaching hum of Sigrist’s 
Morris car, fearful of the assault that they were sure would come their way if Sigrist 
caught them in the open. One sixteen-year old girl learned to remember the name 
‘Sickrest, as it hissed down every street,’ a man who attacked people so ‘ferociously’ 
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that he would break their arms.49 In groups of seven or eight, Sigrist’s men would 
force their way through the narrow streets of the Old City, pushing local people 
aside and making them salute the police in ‘humiliation operations.’ At the Old City 
gates officers slapped and kicked Arabs passing through. Abu Gharbiyah 
remembers Sigrist to have been an ‘abnormal,’ ‘crazy’ man who broke one man’s 
jaw and ‘destroyed his looks.’ Sigrist had ratcheted up his brutality after the killing 
of Constable Bird on 28 May, which might explain the subsequent attack on the al-
Difa‘ office.50 There were so many local protests about Sigrist that the leaders of the 
Istiqlal (Independence) party met J.H. Hall, the Mandate Chief Secretary, to make a 
complaint about the goings-on but there was no response to these petitions, so 
Jerusalemites ‘condemned’ and ‘sentenced’ Sigrist to death and it was for this 
reason that Abu Gharbiyah and al-Ansari had teamed up and were together outside 
the city walls at around 11.00 a.m. on 12 June 1936 watching Sigrist’s car 
approaching from the direction of St Stephen’s Gate.51 
 
What Abu Gharbiyah does not discuss is the role that personal pique – what Roy 
Baumeister in his study of evil has categorized as ‘egotism and revenge’ – played in 
the decision to target Sigrist.52 Policemen had badly assaulted al-Ansari and Sigrist 
had beaten and humiliated Abu Gharbiyah on three or four occasions. In one 
encounter, Sigrist had caught Abu Gharbiyah in the street in Jerusalem and while 
remaining in his car had searched Abu Gharbiyah through the lowered window, 
patting him down while he stood on the pavement. Sigrist asked Abu Gharbiyah 
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what he did for a job, and then he got out of the car saying ‘please’ so that Abu 
Gharbiyah would step out of the way to allow the door to be opened. Sigrist then 
searched him again while also trying to punch and slap Abu Gharbiyah’s face and 
head. When Abu Gharbiyah protected himself from the blows, Sigrist kicked him 
and then tried to strike or ‘box’ him again. (The use of the rather archaic verb ‘to 
box’ in the records might be the result of the passion for this sport in the British 
Army and police at this time. It might also explain the rather anachronistic phrase in 
Hebrew current into the 1980s, and perhaps picked up from the British: ani etten 
lekha box – ‘I’ll give you a box’.) With his tarbush knocked to the ground, Abu 
Gharbiyah retreated back along the pavement, so Sigrist put his hand on his 
revolver and said, ‘go away or I’ll shoot you.’ As al-Ansari died and left no record, 
unlike Abu Gharbiyah, his personal motivations can only be surmised but he had a 
history of violence, having murdered three Jews in an attack at Jerusalem’s Edison 
theatre on 16 May 1936, an attack in which Abu Gharbiyah was supposed to have 
participated but from which he was kept away by the official curfew in force at the 
time, he claims.53 Abu Gharbiyah’s memory – perhaps informed by some ex post 
facto justification – is that the Edison cinema attack was retaliation for the killing of 
‘their best friend,’ Mahmoud al-Tamimi, murdered outside his house by Jewish 
assassins.54 It is not clear whether Sigrist’s supposed Jewish antecedence played any 
part in the decision to attack him.55 Both British officials and Jews generally were 
suitable targets, it seems. 
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Abu Gharbiyah targeted other British servicemen on the basis of their branch of the 
armed forces. Thus, some forty days after the attempt on Sigrist he attacked two 
Royal Air Force (RAF) servicemen, near the same spot as the 12 June assault, 
shooting them with a pistol hidden inside his tarbush.56 This is a reference to the 
shooting by an ‘unknown assailant’ of Aircraftsman C.D. White and a colleague on 
the Jericho road near Gethsemane on 10 August 1936.57 White died; the other man 
was wounded. Abu Gharbiyah picked out the two men because of the RAF’s heavy 
involvement in aerial bombing of rebels in the countryside of Palestine. Indeed, 
before attacking them, he had considered targeting a Jewish carpentry shop in the 
Old City, near al-Ansari's house, but had subsequently changed his mind, ‘since the 
English were the main enemies.’58 ‘The target had to be English as they were 
responsible for the killing.’59 Again, with Constable Bird’s death on 28 May 1936, 
one of the men arrested for the crime was a ‘near relative’ of a Jerusalemite shot by 
British police the previous week at St Stephen’s Gate.60 The suggestion here is that 
Bird’s death was a planned revenge attack, albeit against any British serviceman. 
 
There are other explanations for the attacks on those such as Sigrist. Abu Gharbiyah 
and al-Ansari were also young men, a significant point when it came to their 
decision to use direct physical force and part of a wider tradition of energized youth 
clashing with its more pacific conservative elders on how best to achieve political 
ends – in this case within the Palestinian nationalist movement, and relevant not just 
in 1936 but also in the current Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In 1936, al-Ansari had 
16 
 
visited his relatives and neighbours, the Husaynis, in the Musrara neighbourhood 
where they all lived, and confronted his uncle, Jamal, who was to leave for London 
to talk with the British to try to resolve the Arab revolt. In this exchange, as recorded 
by Serene, Jamal’s daughter, in her memoirs, al-Ansari blurted out: 
 
’Uncle Jamal, we are fed up with your politics. You go to London and try 
your negotiations there. But we will try ours here, in the land of Palestine.’ 
My father was shocked. He turned pale, but, smiling nervously, asked: ‘And 
who are “we”?’ Sami [al-Ansari], now as pale as my father, responded 
defiantly: ‘We are the youth of this country.’61 
 
Had al-Ansari lived, he and Abu Gharbiyah would likely have made further violent 
attacks as a team; they would have become what a later generation would 
glamorously call ‘urban guerrillas’ fighting to save their nation and eschewing the 
political moderation of their elders, their political cause justifying any assaults on 
British officials and Jewish settlers. 
 
In interview, Abu Gharbiyah extended British brutality to include torture, headed 
up by an ‘Inspector Rex/Ricks.’ This is almost certainly a reference to Jerusalem-
based CID Deputy Superintendent A.W. Riggs,62 a point clarified in subsequent 
correspondence with Abu Gharbiyah.63 This was carried out in dedicated police-run 
torture centres during a six-month period in 1938-39. As well as the main police 
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headquarters at the Russian compound in west Jerusalem – where Israel allegedly 
tortured Palestinians in the 1970s – CID had a separate, secret house at the Talavera 
military camp at the Allenby barracks in south Jerusalem, now covered by 
residential housing; another torture site was in Acre Citadel prison.64 The use of 
Army barracks for joint military-police activities continued after Palestine, in Fort 
Morbut and Waterloo barracks (or Lines) in Aden in the 1960s, and Palace and 
Girdwood barracks in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s.65 (It should be noted here 
that a former Palestine policeman wrote to this author after seeing Abu Gharbiyah’s 
allegations to say that it was ‘hard to believe’ that the ‘amiable’ Riggs was associated 
with torture.)66 
 
According to Abu Gharbiyah, Arab suspects were ‘lifted’ from their homes and 
executed; others found themselves the subject of torture ‘in methods we would hear 
about in the Middle Ages.’ 67 If there were extra-judicial executions, these were, in 
effect, the actions of death squads. This author has found only one officially 
documented account of policemen executing an Arab suspect, which led to an 
investigation and charging of four police officers who received minimal sentences 
reduced on appeal but this was a unique case of servicemen being brought to 
justice.68 Abu Gharbiyah had friends who were abused a variety of ways. In 
addition to regular beatings in which guards knocked out suspects’ teeth and which 
could leave victims ‘almost unrecognizable,’69 Abu Gharbiyah in interview detailed 
a litany of torture, especially in the latter stages of the revolt: 
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 The simplest method – known, ironically, as ‘playful’ – involved tying a 
naked prisoner to a board with his legs raised and tied to a window. Jailers 
would then leave him there for several days during which time he would soil 
himself. 
 Guards would treat prisoners as per the ‘playful’ method described above 
but they would also tie the prisoner’s genitals, after which the guards would 
rub or beat the swollen organ. In at least one case, such torture led to the 
severing/tearing of the testicles, resulting in their having to be stitched. One 
British officer recalled a lighted cigarette applied to a Palestinian prisoner’s 
testicles.70 Similarly, British soldiers and police in Northern Ireland in the 
1970s allegedly squeezed suspects’ testicles and inserted objects into anuses 
or insinuated that they would do so.71 
 At the Talavera camp, police officers laid a ‘religious man’ on the ground, 
inserted a funnel into his mouth, and poured in water after which they 
stepped on the man’s distended stomach. 
 There was the ‘crucifixion’ torture in which guards laid the prisoner on a 
table with a 2 cm. ridge running down the middle, along the prisoner’s spine. 
They then tied sandbags to the prisoner’s arms and legs. 
 The police also used ‘awful’ local Arabs to rape (male) prisoners – employing 
a ‘Castero/Kastero’ in Jaffa and a ‘Saleh Alwalaji’ in Jerusalem for this 
purpose, both subsequently assassinated by the rebels but ‘there were others’ 
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– to the extent that some handsome young Arab men would be detained for 
the purpose of sexual abuse. As guards told one naked female detainee in 
Bethlehem’s Ladies’ prison whom they had previously tortured, ‘If you won’t 
speak, we’ll bring a nigger to rape you’ – although the victim did also recall 
that ‘it seems that they had an order not to rape me.’ Various officers did, 
however, molest her.72 Similarly, the British in Kenya in the 1950s used local 
Kenyan askaris to sodomize prisoners, Elkins claims.73 
 Finally, at a ‘Christian site’ close to Kfar Etzion south of Jerusalem, prisoners 
would daily dig holes of 2-1-1 meters dimension, and then fill them in, 
endlessly repeating the labour. This is a reference to the Russian monastery 
built on a Byzantine site close to Kfar Etzion – in Arabic, Dayr al-Shi’ar.74 
 
Abu Gharbiyah remembers that a Jewish police officer ‘Sofer’ took part in torturing 
suspects, a point supported by the written record in which two Britons, Biggs and 
Robinson,75 and a Jew, Sofer,76 were ‘principal offenders.’77 Robinson – of ‘Greek’ 
descent – once interrogated Abu Gharbiyah who also recalls a ‘notorious’ CID 
officer of (Christian) Lebanese origin, Muneer Abu Fadel, who later became a 
member of Lebanon’s parliament. Abu Gharbiyah’s memory is that the police and 
prison service carried out these pre-meditated tortures, not the Army which simply 
wrecked villages and shot people. In prison, the British would get Jewish guards to 
beat Arab suspects and vice versa.78 The British also ‘ordered’ the Arab police to 
carry out torture.79 The British also maltreated Jewish detainees. 
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As with Sigrist, the written record supports Abu Gharbiyah’s memory of the torture 
at the Talavera camp and elsewhere, with accounts in Arabic and English of torture, 
of Arabs being blown to bits in vehicles after being forced along roads in which the 
British had placed mines, of British operatives placing ‘terrorist’ bombs, of detainees 
being left in open cages in the sun without sustenance, of men being beaten with 
wet ropes, ‘boxed’ and having their teeth smashed, and men having their feet burnt 
with oil.80 Those who were ‘boxed’ were beaten until they were knocked out, 
‘needles’ were used on suspects, dogs were set upon Arab detainees, and British and 
Jewish auxiliary forces maltreated Arabs by having them hold heavy stones and 
then beating them when they dropped them. Guards also used bayonets on sleep-
deprived men and made them wear bells around their necks and then dance.81 Arab 
detainees in Palestine’s prisons protested in petitions made through the Christian 
(British) Anglican mission at the extreme treatment meted out by guards. Prisoners 
jumped to their deaths from high windows to escape their captors, had their 
testicles tied with cord, were tortured with strips of wood with nails in, had wire 
tightened around their big toes, hair was torn from their faces and heads, special 
instruments were used to pull out fingernails, red hot skewers were used on 
detainees, prisoners were sodomized, boiling oil was used on prisoners as were 
intoxicants (morphine, cocaine and heroin), there were electric shocks, water was 
funnelled into suspects’ stomachs and there were mock executions.82 As Frances 
Newton, a pro-Arab British resident in Palestine noted, after the murder on 26 
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September 1937 by Arab gunmen of Lewis Andrews, ‘the police asked permission to 
use torture to the prisoners to extract information and that permission was granted 
from the Colonial Office. Several of the leading police officers in Jerusalem refused 
to countenance it. One of them has since left the country.’83 Newton’s complaints led 
to an official order banning her from Palestine. 
 
The British police at the grass-roots level were typically former soldiers – indeed, 
until the early 1930s this was required of new recruits. They were tough men who 
were given military-style training at their depot on Mount Scopus to prepare them 
for tough, necessary jobs such as riot control. Sigrist had been in the Army – and 
continued on the Reserve list, retiring as a lieutenant-colonel – and like his fellow 
officers was accustomed to violent encounters with Palestinians and Jews. The 
citation for Sigrist’s King’s Police Medal, awarded in 1934 for service rendered at 
riots in Jaffa in 1933, shows how hard colonial policing could be: ‘In the first charge 
he [Sigrist] was severely wounded in the face by a broken bottle, and though 
severely injured in both arms and legs, he remained on duty and led his men in a 
second and third baton charge.’84 Many policemen saw their service as akin to 
serving in the French Foreign Legion, and made explicit reference to this – ‘a British 
Foreign Legion. With the faults as well’ – and some seem to have acted 
accordingly.85 One Palestine policeman had been in the French Foreign Legion and 
opined that it was ‘cushy’ by comparison to service in Palestine.86 A ‘Legion of the 
Lost’ was how another policeman described service in the 1920s.87 Moreover, in the 
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early life of the Palestine police, many of its recruits were men who had fought 
against Irish nationalists in the Irish war of independence and so came with 
experience of that brutal conflict, imbuing the force with a robust ethos when it 
came to policing the country. The British divisional commander in Jerusalem, Sir 
Richard O’Connor, wrote of the use of the ‘third degree’ and ‘black and tan 
methods’ (oft-used phrases), the latter a reference to the infamous British 
paramilitary force known as the ‘Black and Tans’ that operated against Irish rebels.88 
 
Some level of violence by ordinary policemen should not surprise us, more 
especially considering the job that they had to do in Palestine during the turbulence 
of the Arab revolt after April 1936. What is more surprising is the behaviour of some 
higher echelon officers. Sir Charles Tegart, a senior police officer brought in from 
India, established torture centres, known euphemistically as ‘Arab Investigation 
Centres,’ where suspects got the ‘third degree’ until they ‘spilled the beans,’ the 
British only closing a major one in a Jewish quarter of West Jerusalem after colonial 
officials such as Edward Keith-Roach complained to the High Commissioner.89 This 
could be a reference to the Talavera torture centre, located as it was close to the 
Jewish neighbourhood of Talpiyot in south-west Jerusalem. The use of the phrase 
‘third degree’ reappeared in Kenya, where the ‘Arab’ Investigation Centres were 
replaced with ‘Mau Mau’ Investigation Centres in which British forces conducted 
the worst torture.90 In Palestine, interrogators used the ‘water-boarding’ torture at 
these centres.91 Abu Gharbiyah states that torture only ended in Jerusalem after 
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questions were asked in Britain’s Parliament, possibly a reference to Mr Maxton’s 
question to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in June 1939 about ‘gross’ charges 
against the Mandate authorities, ‘foul and filthy ones.’92 Keith-Roach, to his credit, 
raised the issue that the ‘questionable practises’ carried out by CID officers on 
suspects were counter-productive both in terms of the information gathered and the 
effect that they had on local people’s confidence in the police.93 
 
The British used euphemisms, sporting metaphors and humour to describe their 
violent clashes with Palestinians. Or they just said nothing. Or there was laconic 
under-statement. Jack Binsley in his memoir of his time as a Palestine policeman 
recalled that following the rebels’ placing of sharp tacks on the roads of Jerusalem, 
‘a directive was issued that in future we were not to be Aunt Sallys, but should 
assert our authority and take the initiative.’94 The issue here is how the British 
‘asserted’ themselves, officially and unofficially, and whether the minimum force 
that supposedly characterized British counter-rebel operations and which 
underpinned their taking the ‘initiative’ often, in reality, escalated quickly to the use 
of ‘excessive’ force, a bland phrase that masked all manner of strippings, beatings, 
humiliations, torture, theft, sexual violence, hunger and trauma. A 
contemporaneous phrase for such activity was ‘frightfulness,’ used during the First 
World War to describe German excesses in occupied France and which now seems 
dated and quaint. 95 The variation between the official and unofficial accounts of 
events during the Arab revolt suggests a hidden history of semi-official, excessive 
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violence, when one can find the evidence. Thus, following the assassination of two 
Black Watch, Scottish-based, Regiment soldiers by the Jaffa Gate in Jerusalem on 5 
November 1937 General Sir Archibald Wavell, the supreme British commander in 
Palestine at the time (and originally an officer in the Black Watch), remarked on the 
restraint shown by the regiment on a subsequent operation against Silwan, the 
village south of the city blamed for the attack, although he admitted that a suspect 
died ‘falling over a cliff.’96 Officially, after tracker dogs following the scent of the 
soldiers’ killers led the authorities to Silwan, one villager ended up hospital after 
falling off a cliff, while soldiers shot dead one man and wounded another. Then the 
authorities sealed the village forbidding villagers to leave without a permit, made 
all males report every evening to the police and made the village pay for a twenty-
man police post.97 Yet, the private diary of a North Staffordshire Regiment officer 
tells a different tale, recording how Black Watch men beat to death twelve Arabs in 
Silwan with rifle butts.98 The assailants apparently left the two dead soldiers face 
down with their kilts raised and buttocks exposed, further enraging their comrades: 
‘An insult the local Arabs suffered for.’99 Another British officer recalled that the 
‘Jocks’ (slang for the Scottish) were uncontrollable after their comrades’ deaths and 
so the high command gave them eight hours to ‘search’ Silwan without rifles: ‘a lot 
of Arabs were very sorry that it had happened.’100 
 
To give a beating with a rifle-butt some human substance – to state clearly rather 
than to understate what such an assault really means – consider the following 
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account of a rifle-butt beating delivered by a British policeman (properly a 
gendarme at this time) to a Palestinian in the 1920s: ‘When one of the Nablus 
detachment produced an old cigarette tin containing the brains of a man whose 
skull he had splintered with his rifle butt….I felt physically sick….the sight of that 
grog-blossomed face of the gendarme with his can half-full of human brains 
proudly brandishing his smashed rifle-butt as proof of his prowess, altered 
something inside of me; people who owned skins other than pink Western ones 
became human beings.’101 The same policeman, in another memoir of his time in 
Palestine, wrote of a beating he was delivering to an Arab and how he ‘thought that 
the wood would snap under the impact.’102 
 
This article has shown that by carefully setting Abu Gharbiyah’s oral history against 
the evidence available from other sources, it is possible to provide a fuller account 
both of British methods of colonial policing and the reactions of local peoples, 
giving voice to the colonial officials with the difficult job of maintaining empire and 
to what Edward Said has described as the ‘invisible and inaudible’ Palestinians who 
fought the British in the late 1930s.103 Abu Gharbiyah’s selective memories of the 
1930s open up a useful debate on Britain’s use of force in its colonies during periods 
of unrest, exposing a hidden history of unpleasantness, and one which formed the 
back-drop for the heavy-handed actions of men such as Sigrist. Such actions grate 
against traditional notions of Britain’s use of restraint in countering colonial 
rebellions. That said, British violence does not explain the deaths of the three Jews at 
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the Edison theatre, to give just one example, undermining the notion of righteous 
reactive violence by Abu Gharbiyah and al-Ansari, and suggesting that Palestinian 
violence, as with that of the British, was a vexed, personal business.104 A mix of 
personal revenge, a desire to rid Jerusalem of a violent British official and support 
for the Palestinian national struggle motivated Abu Gharbiyah and al-Ansari’s 
assault on Sigrist. There was also, perhaps, a ‘joy of hurting,’ a nebulous phrase that 
applies a fortiori to Sigrist.105 It is not easy systematically to understand personal acts 
of violence by ‘ordinary men,’ especially in times of conflict.106 Some British officials 
were directly targeted; others were opportunity targets. Moreover, the attack on 
Sigrist was not centrally directed, suggestive of a reactive, poorly coordinated, local 
and ad hoc response by the Palestinians to the British whose ‘counter-insurgency’ – 
born of years of experience of imperial policing and countering colonial rebellions – 
was effective, successful and necessarily violent. 
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